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We analyze the impact of Michigan economic development policies and highway 
infrastructure improvements on per capita income and job growth in 1990s using fixed effect 
estimation procedure. We also improve measurement of policy treatment while accounting for 
possible spillover effect. The policies considered for analysis have significant impact on growth 
outcomes. However this effect is non-linear. The size of this impact changes over time and the 
path of change varies by type of policy. Policy impacts are different between metro and non-
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  1 The Differential Impact of Regional Policies on Economic Growth: 
One Size Does Not Fit All 
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 
Personal income is one of the major determinants of the well being of local population. For 
that reason the level of income, its distribution and growth rate are issues of concern for all levels 
of government. As a result, a large number of federal and local economic development policies 
and programs address these issues. Examples of such programs include improvement of public 
infrastructure, job training, grants, loans, tax abatements, business expansion and retention 
programs, etc. For example, Michigan had more than 40 programs and policy tools specifically 
aimed at economic development by 2000 (CRC, 2001).  
However, with many states currently facing budget difficulties, the role of state government 
in economic development is likely to be challenged with increasing frequency. For that reason, 
the effectiveness of development policies and programs in raising employment and income 
becomes an important question. 
There is a large literature on economic development program evaluation. But there is no 
consistency in the results. Some authors did not find a significant relation between policies and 
growth, while findings of others vary from positive to negative association between the policy 
treatment and growth (see for reviews Bartik, 1991; Fisher, 1997; Wasylenko, 1997; Goss and 
Phillips, 1999; Buss, 2001). The reasons for the variation in findings are numerous. Among them 
are the quality of the data (Buss, 2001); deviation of true political goals from optimal economic 
development path of a region (Wolcoff, 1992; Dewar, 1998; Thornburgh, 1998); imperfections 
in policy evaluation methods (Bartik, 1991; Buss, 2001) and shortcomings in policy design.  
  2 This paper addresses some of the above-mentioned concerns as well as several other 
issues contributing to the lack of consistency in empirical policy assessments. First, an attempt is 
made to improve the measurement of policy treatments. Several previous studies use the 
presence or absence of policy treatment in a larger area (e.g. state) to identify the policy effect. 
Other studies look at the number of development programs available in a region (for review see 
Fisher and Peters, 1997). In contrast, to quantify the policy shock to a local economy, we use 
more precise measures. The intensity of policy use is measured in number of businesses 
receiving a benefit (e.g. tax break) or the area of a zone receiving policy benefit. Second, a 
policy treatment may have a significant spillover effect on neighboring areas (Bartik, 1991; 
Papke, 1993, 1994; Fisher, 1997). This effect arises due to regional production and consumption 
relationships (multiplier effect), migration, and commuting patterns. To capture these additional 
benefits, we consider regions surrounding the area where the policy is implemented. For that 
reason, a county is used as a unit of analysis
1. Third, a large number of policies and programs are 
implemented simultaneously. Several of them are mutually exclusive or additive by design. This 
fact may lead to mixing the impacts of different policies on the one hand. On the other hand, 
programs may have mutually increasing or decreasing effect. To address these issues, we 
consider several policies at the same time. Fourth, design and implementation of policies as well 
as response of private sector to new conditions take time. Also, some policies may have a short-
lived effect, while others impact long-run growth patterns. So the timing of policy impact differs 
for different development outcomes (Papke, 1994). For that reason, we estimate policy effects on 
one, two, three and four-year average growth rate. Also policies may have different primary 
                                                 
1 One may argue that a county is a too large area to capture the effect of treatment applied to just one business 
establishment or the effect of a couple of acres of a tax-free zone. However, if anything we would underestimate the 
policy effect since local commuting zones normally include several counties (Tolbert and Sizer, 1996). Supply and 
demand chains are even wider. 
  3 objectives (e.g. job vs. income growth; growth of large vs. small businesses, growth vs. 
redistribution of income, etc.) Two alternative policy outcomes are considered to address these 
potential differences: income and job growth. And finally, the same policies may have 
significantly different results in different geographic areas due to heterogeneity of local 
economies. This heterogeneity can lead to an aggregation error and biased empirical results 
(Forni and Lippi, 1997). Separate estimation of policy effects in metro/non-metro, 
manufacturing-dependent/independent and high/low income areas is undertaken to assess the 
significance of this problem.  
Some support for concerns mentioned above can be found in the literature. Loh (1993) 
finds evidence of heterogeneity of development policy effect on job growth across different 
industries. Also the effect of different policies on the same outcome and the same policy on 
different measures of growth are different. Similar evidence can be found in Delanberg and 
Partridge (1995), Luce (1994) and Papke (1991). R. Fisher (1997) suggests that this 
heterogeneity can be explained by different marginal return to factors targeted by policies across 
industries and sectors. Other authors argue that the effect of policies should differ with respect to 
other conditions of local economy. However, this debate is also full of controversy. The above-
mentioned issues can be restated in the following hypotheses: 
•  A policy effect on both income and job growth changes over time. 
•  The effect of development policies is different between metropolitan and non-metropolitan 
areas.  
•  The impact of development policies varies with industrial structure and income level of local 
economy.  
•  An interaction among development policy effects is significant. 
  4 To test these hypotheses, this paper analyzes impacts of Michigan economic development 
policies and improvements in highway infrastructure on county per capita income and job 
growth in the 1990s.  
Focusing on the economy of just one state effectively controls for unobservable factors in the 
growth equation such as the legal system, culture, other statewide institutions, and natural 
amenities. Loh (1993) mentions that such an approach would greatly improve the quality of data 
on development policies since compatibility is no longer an issue. This approach also allows 
excluding variance in macroeconomic factors as a potential sources of bias. In addition Loh 
points that focusing on a single state reduces greatly a simultaneity bias. Also Michigan is 
somewhat isolated from the direct impact of conditions in neighboring states by the Great Lakes 
that surround it.  
The rest of the paper is structured in the following way. Part two provides a brief 
introduction to the conditions of Michigan economy and explains the nature of the economic 
development policies under consideration. Next, we turn to the justification of empirical model 
used for policy analysis. Part four describes the data, and part five presents the results. Part six 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. MICHIGAN DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 
Michigan is a heavily industrialized state. While its population accounts for 3.5 percent 
of the U.S total (Census Bureau, 2000), the state contribution to the national manufacturing 
output was 5.4 percent in 2000 (BEA). Motor Vehicles Manufacturing is a single most important 
industry for the Michigan economy. While major facilities are in metropolitan areas, the auto 
companies have outsourced many parts to small manufacturers across the state, providing 
employment outside the metropolitan areas. 
  5 During 1990s Michigan real personal income per capita grew at an average of 1.44 
percent, slightly outpacing the national average of 1.36 percent (Figure 1); the job growth pattern 
was similar. Even though the state economy went through structural changes contributed to the 
growth, this period is also known for an aggressive role of the state and local government played 
in economic development (Bartik et al., 2003; CRC, 2001). Those efforts were mirrored in the 
sharp increase of the state’s ranking by Site Selection Magazine. This magazine evaluates the 
effectiveness of state development policies by compiling the number of new and expanded 
facilities
2. Michigan was ranked the first among all the states for five consecutive years from 
1997 to 2001 (Bartik et al., 2003) recovered from 17
th place in 1989. 
 









Data: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Inflation Adjusted. 
Figure 1. Personal Income Growth Per Capita 
 
However this improvement should be treated with caution. Faulk (2002) finds that only 
around 25 percent of new jobs clamed by policy beneficiaries can be attributed to the policy 
effect. The rest would have been created anyway. Similar number is presented by Papke (1994) 
and some other authors. Moreover, Fisher and Peters (1997) argue that a policy effect of the job 
                                                 
2 Based on jobs, square footage, or dollars invested. 
  6 growth can be negative due to factor substitution. Thus, a much more careful evaluation of the 
policy effects on growth is necessary. 
We pay particular attention to potential heterogeneity of policy effects across different 
local economies. To make comparison between growth patterns in metropolitan and non-
metropolitan areas, the state is split in two parts. The southern part includes 41 Michigan 
metropolitan and metropolitan adjacent counties (Beale Codes 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8). We call this 
area the metropolitan part for the purpose of our analysis. The northern part includes 42 
Michigan non-metropolitan, relatively rural, counties (about 55% of the state land area). About 
90 percent of Michigan’s total population resides in the metropolitan portion. Those two parts of 
the State have different migration and commuting patterns as well as the structure of regional 
economies. For that reason we expect the policy effects to differ between the two parts of the 
state.  
The other dimensions of potential heterogeneity are the industrial structure of the local 
economy and levels of personal income. There is a strong correlation among them, however this 
correlation is not perfect, which leaves an opportunity to use those characteristics as potentially 
different dimensions of policy effects. 
This paper focuses on a group of policies initiated during 1990s that have been implemented 
in a substantial proportion of Michigan counties. The effect of those new policies is compared to 
the more traditional development tools such as an improvement in road infrastructure.  
The policies considered for the analysis are the following: 
• Michigan Economic Growth Authorities (MEGA) program grants eligible businesses 
with Single Business and Income tax credits for 8 to 20 years. The program targets “large-scale 
investment and job creation, as well as attraction of technology-intensive business” (CRC, 2001, 
  7 p. 20). The purpose of the program is to support the projects that “would not occur absent the 
MEGA grant”. There is no targeting of specific geographic area, however businesses located in 
federal designated distressed zones have a lower eligibility threshold. The program started in 
1995 and by the end of 2000 there were 107 authorities which directly and indirectly created 
145,542 jobs
3. The number of MEGAs per 100,000 of county residents measures the treatment of 
this policy. The intensity of this normalized treatment averages at .33 MEGAs per county in non-
metropolitan areas and .26 MEGAs in metropolitan part of the state (for descriptive statistics see 
Table A1.4 in Appendix).  
As found by Bradshaw (2002) around 70 percent of new jobs generated by an expanded or 
new business are created during the first year of the expansion. For that reason we would expect 
much of the effect of MEGAs on the job growth to be short run. New employment would lead to 
additional labor income, which in turn would be partially diverted to neighboring communities 
by commuters. However, the consumption linkages of new workers and supply/demand linkages 
of MEGAs would amplify the income effect. We would expect that MEGA effect on income 
growth would be lower than the effect on job growth but lasting longer. 
Even though county economic conditions do not enter the formal eligibility criteria, 
endogeneity of MEGA effect may occur if more of the eligible business establishments are 
attracted to counties with higher growth potential. If this were true, a simple correlation between 
MEGA and growth would be biased upward. 
• The Renaissance Zone (RZ) program provides firms and individual residents of the state’s 
most economically distressed areas with a waiver of virtually all state and local taxes for the 
purpose of revitalization of those areas (CRC, 1998, 2001). This program uses Michigan State 
Housing Development Authority definition of an “economically distressed area” for targeting 
                                                 
3 Based on estimates by Michigan Economic Development Corporation. 
  8 (CRC, 1998). This definition is based on an area’s average income level and change in real 
property values.  
The program was established in 1996. In the first round 11 zones were created in 14 counties 
for terms ranging from 10 to 15 years. The zone areas were from 110 to 2202 acres. The second 
round was in 2000 and nine new zones were created increasing the total number of counties with 
the zones to 29. The creation of new zones ended in December of 2002. By that time 34 
Renaissance Zones were functioning.  
For the purpose of our analysis the RZ policy treatment is measured in acres of the zone per 
1,000 of county residents. The intensity of treatment averages 3.36 acres per 1,000 residents in 
non-metropolitan areas and around 0.37 acres in metropolitan areas (see Table A1.4 in 
Appendix). 
The design of this program benefits primarily small businesses and individual residents 
(CRC, 1998). For that reason, we would expect the policy effect to come through higher income 
of self-employed residents and property owners. For that reason the spillover effect of the 
program is expected to be large. Papke (1994) in her analysis of a similar program in Indiana 
claims that the zone residents take only 4% of all jobs and 15-20% of new jobs in the zone
4. 
The estimated effect of RZ on growth may be biased downward since the policy targets areas 
with lower potential for growth, and counties with lager area of the zone would also have more 
distressed areas. 
• Brownfield Development Authority (BDA) program targets re-development of 
“blighted”, “functionally obsolete” and contaminated sites (CRC, 2001, p. 31). BDAs are 
allowed to use tax increment for redevelopment of the brownfield sites. In addition there are state 
bonds “dedicated to brownfield remediation”. Also, the BDAs projects are eligible for Single 
                                                 
4 For review of literature on Enterprise Zone programs in US see Papke (1993). 
  9 Business Tax credits. Michigan adopted the program in 1996 and by the end of 2000 there were 
170 Authorities. We use a number of BDAs in a county per 100,000 of population to quantify the 
policy treatment. Its intensity averages 0.81 authorities in non-metropolitan counties and .35 in 
the metropolitan part (see table A1.4 in Appendix). 
It is hard to justify any job growth effect generated by BDA
5 except of the site cleaning 
temporary jobs. However, BDAs bring previously underutilized land into active economic use 
increasing property value. For that reason the effect of BDAs on income growth is expected to be 
higher in metro areas where the land is more scarce. It is hard to determine the direction of bias 
with certainty since more distressed areas would potentially have higher number of brownfields 
available for redevelopment, but on the other hand higher demand for sites is expected in faster 
growing areas. 
• Improvement in highway infrastructure is another development tool. It may lead to 
reduction in commuting time and transportation cost contributing to long-term growth of both 
employment and income. It is hard to think about a source of bias for this policy effect on county 
growth since construction of major roads follows a long-term plan and is funded primarily 
through state and federal budgets. 
The effect of highways is measured in terms of miles of federal, state and major county 
highways and roads per 1,000 of residents. Michigan has on average 14.41 miles per 1,000 
residents in non-metropolitan counties and around 2.52 miles per 1,000 residents in metropolitan 
areas. The fact that policy treatment was assigned by state or federal agencies reduces 
endogeneity of policy shock to county growth conditions if selection criteria are controlled. 
                                                 
5 For discussion see Mayer and Lyons (2000), DeSousa (2000) 
 
  10 The data on policies come from the Michigan Economic Development Corporation, Citizens 
Research Council of Michigan and the State of Michigan government. Policy treatment is 
measured as of January 1 of a given year. 
The set of policies under consideration does not include some important programs such as 
direct incentives, job training, loan guarantees, subsidies, etc. This exclusion is driven by the 
data availability and spatial scale of policy implementation. However, the policies considered in 
this study are good representatives of four groups of development incentives widely used in other 
states. MEGA represents a class of firm-level tax abatements. RZ are akin to a wide range of 
programs targeting revitalization of economically distressed areas (e.g. Enterprise Zones). BDA 
represents programs that do not have job growth or business creation/expansion as a primary 
objective. And finally, highway system expansion is a typical example of infrastructure 
improvement activity. Moreover, “[of] all the public services examined for an influence on 
economic development, transportation services, and highway facilities especially, show the most 
substantial evidence of a relationship” (Fisher, 1997, p.54). 
 
2. Empirical Model  
There are several approaches to the development policy analysis. Among others case 
studies, simulations and econometric analysis are used most frequently. Each of them has its own 
benefits and weaknesses (Bartik, 1991; Sadoulet and deJanry, 1995; Fisher and Peters, 1997; 
Goss and Phillips, 1999). Econometric analysis is the most appropriate to use for answering the 
research questions of this study with the policy data described above. 
Simple correlation analysis of policy treatments and growth will likely to produce biased 
results since, as we argue above, some policies target specifically areas with lower growth rate, 
while some others are likely to be applied more in the areas with higher potential for growth. 
  11 There are two ways around this problem. First, we can look for plausible instrumental variables 
for policy treatment and estimate the policy effect with two stage least squares procedure (e.g. 
Goss and Phillips, 1999). Second, we can control within the estimation model for policy 
selection criteria. Recognizing all the advantages and difficulties of the first approach, we use the 
second one for the current analysis. 
To explain the variation in the growth rates, which may also control for selection in policy 
application, a conditional convergence model (1) is utilized (Barro, 1998). This model is typical 
to the growth literature (Durlauf et al., 2001). The model suggests that growth is negatively 
related to the initial level of capital, conditioned on the variables describing economic, social and 
natural environment (Barro, 1998; Démurger et al., 2001; Rupasingha et al., 2002; Sachs et al., 
2001). Those “conditions”, in turn, determine a steady state of a local economy.  
 
(1) GR= +  capital+  “conditions”+ policy+u  0 β 1 β 2 β 3 β
 
Vector Capital includes initial levels of physical, human and public capital. This model is an 
extension of the baseline Solow growth model, which allows for adding a new growth 
determinant into the model. Thus, development policies are added to those determinants.  
A fixed effect procedure is used for estimation of the growth model. We compare this 
procedure with alternatives following similar steps as in Garcia-Mila, et al. (1996). The fixed 
effect model turns out to be more efficient. On the other hand, Bartik (1991, 1997) while 
admitting advantages of the fixed effect procedure argues that this procedure may exacerbate the 
measurement error problem. 
The main benefit of the selected procedure is that it controls for unobserved factors in the 
growth model that are fixed over time. Some of those factors (e.g. geographic and institutional 
  12 conditions) may also determine the application of policy. Thus, ignoring those factors would 
cause selection bias of the estimation results. 
Resulting estimation model takes the following form
6: 
(2) GRt-t’= + incomet+ educt+ incomet*educt+ 4 jobt  0 β 1 β 2 β 3 β β
+ 5 yeart+ 6 manuft+ 7 denst+ 8 dens_et +  policyt+e+ut  β β β β β
 
where GRt-t’ is the growth rate between years t and t’ (t’>t). The growth of both per 
capita income and of jobs in a county are considered in turns. Each dependent variable is 
measured as one, two, three and four-year averages, resulting in a set of eight seemingly 
unrelated regressions. 
The level of real per capita income (income) measured in logarithmic terms serves as a 
proxy for the stock of physical capital. The share of people with a bachelor’s degree, 
denoted by educ controls for human capital. The regional socio-economic conditions are 
controlled with number of jobs per 1,000 of county residents (job). Year binary variables 
(year) control for time specific shocks common to all counties (e.g. inflation, national 
business activity conditions, etc.). The number of jobs per capita in manufacturing (manuf) 
controls for the structure of the local economy. Density of population (dens) and business 
establishments (dens_e) controls for the degree of concentration and urbanization. Variable 
e denotes unobserved county conditions that are fixed over time. Finally, u is an 
idiosyncratic error. All the variables are measured at the beginning of period t. 
The model omits a number of factors relevant to income growth. Among them are local 
taxes, natural amenities, and quality of local government, spatial interdependence of the regions, 
etc. Most of them can be source of omitted variable bias. However, these factors have little 
variability over time. For that reason, county fixed effect should control for their influence. 
                                                 
6 The indexes for counties are suppressed. 
  13 A vector of policy treatments (Policy) is of primary interest. Fixed effect estimation reveals 
how the change in policy application for the same entity associates with change in the growth 
rate controlling for other factors. 
To test the hypothesis about the cross-policy effects, the interaction terms among the policies 
are also included in the base model. The base model is estimated separately for metropolitan and 
non-metropolitan counties, counties with above and below average share of manufacturing and 
per capita income to test for heterogeneity of policy effects. 
 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION 
Local Area Annual Estimates from the Bureau of Economic Analysis is a primary source of 
the data for the dependent and control variables in 83 of Michigan counties for the years 1993 – 
2000. 
The mean value of the real per capita personal income growth ranges from 1.2 to 1.6 percent 
per year; the variation drops as an average over longer period is considered, as should be 
expected (Table A1). Average job growth varies from .8 to 1.0 percent per year. Fewer 
observations are available on longer-term growth. Even though there is a 50-60 percent positive 
correlation between income and employment growth, the variables reflect some different 
dimensions of economic growth. 
Regarding the control variables, the level of real per capita income, measured in 1990 prices, 
averages 20,795 USD. The logarithm form of this variable is used for the estimation. There is on 
average 8.1 percent of population with bachelor’s degree in our sample. There are on average 
541 jobs per 1,000 of residents and 101 of those jobs are in manufacturing. There are on average 
1,188.6 of residents and 25.1 business establishments per square mile. Additional descriptive 
statistics and data sources can be found in Appendix 1. 
  14  
4. RESULTS.  
The main estimation results are presented in Tables 2-5 and A2.1-A2.6 of Appendix 2. 
Tables A2.1 and A2.2 present the estimates of the base model (2) of policy impact on income 
and job growth respectively.  
In each table for each separate region of the state columns contain fixed effect estimates 
of policy treatment and control variables on one, two, three and four-year average growth rate 
denoted by gr1 through gr4 respectively. Before turning to the description of the results we 
should mention that the number of observations available on the longer run growth is lower than 
on the shorter run. It prevents us from making statistical comparison of the differences of policy 
impact over time. However comparison of those results provides some insight on changes in 
policy effect and serves as a check for robustness of results over different time periods. 
 
4.1. Base model 
The estimates of our base income growth model are presented in table A2.1. As predicted 
by theory, the initial level of income is negatively related to the growth. A higher level of 
education is positively related to the growth, however estimates are statistically significant only 
for one-year growth. Interactions of income and education levels are negative and significant. 
Higher number of jobs per capita corresponds to higher growth rate as does a higher density of 
business establishments in a county. 
The estimates of the policy effect on income growth look discouraging. Very few 
individual policy coefficients are statistically significant and only for longer run growth. The 
policies joint effect on three and four-year average growth is statistically significant.  
  15 The estimation results of policy effects on job growth (Table A2.2) are a little more 
informative. There is a significant relation between growth and highway infrastructure 
improvements. The linear term (denoted by hwy_0) is negative implying that one additional mile 
per 1,000 of county residents reduces the job growth by 0.3 – 0.6 percent per year. However, this 
effect becomes more positive with more miles per capita (the quadratic term, denoted by hwy_2, 
is positive). The effect of highways becomes positive if there are about 40 - 60 miles of 
highways per 1,000 of residents. The association of the job growth with the Renaissance Zone 
acreage is positive and occasionally significant. The cumulative effect of MEGAs on the growth 
is positive and significant, however for the longer run the linear relation is negative. Policy 
variables are jointly significant at one percent level in explaining variation in county average 
growth rate for all periods. 
This is the point where many researchers would stop further investigation of the issue or 
would move to the instrumental variable estimation, blaming downward selection bias. However, 
in this paper, we hypothesize that policy effect is heterogeneous and changes with a type of local 
economy. This unaccounted heterogeneity hides significance of policy effects. 
 
4.2. Heterogeneity of policy effect 
Why does the base model fail to assess the policy impact on growth? The effect of each 
policy can be significantly different depending on the structure of the economy in various sub-
regions of the state. If this heterogeneity exists, but is ignored, the estimation results would 
present a weighted average of the effects in the separate sub-zones (subpopulations) with 
corresponding large standard error. To show whether it is the case, we estimate separately the 
base income and job growth models for metropolitan/non-metropolitan counties. The summary 
  16 of the results is presented in Table 2 in this section and discussed in details
7. Similar estimates 
are presented for the counties with above/below the state average number of jobs in 
manufacturing (Table 3) and per capita personal income (Table 4).  
To test the significance of the observed difference in estimation results between the sub-
regions, we interact the policy variables with binary variables for the sub-areas. Statistical 
significance of the interaction term indicates that the policy effect is statistically different 
between the sub-areas under consideration. In Tables 2 – 5 we have denoted with bold font the 
estimates that are statistically different between the sub-areas at 10% significance level. 
 
Metro/ non-metro difference 
We start with the difference between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. The 
strongest difference is observed in the impact of highways on the measures of growth. The 
difference in the policy effect on income growth is jointly significant (see F-statistics for the 
difference term at the bottom of each panel). It implies that policy impact is different in 
metropolitan and non-metropolitan counties. The job growth model is much less different 
between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas.  
Those differences can be easily seen when we estimate our models separately for 
metropolitan/non-metropolitan areas (Table 2; see complete results in Tables A2.3, A2.4). 
Contrary to the base model, the policy variables are jointly significant for both income and job 
growth and for all growth periods with exception of the four-year model in metropolitan area 
(see F-statistics for joint policy effect). 
Individual policy effects are also significant for some of the growth periods. 
 
                                                 
7 Full set of results can be found in Appendix Tables A2.3 and A2.4. 
  17 TABLE 2. Michigan Development Policy Effects by Metro/non-metro 
TABLE 2: Panel A. Income Growth, Metro/non-metro   
  Metropolitan  Non-metropolitan 
  gr1 gr2 gr3 gr4  gr1 gr2 gr3 gr4 





























































































































































































    
 
Highways 
Turning to the individual policy estimates, the association between income growth and highway 
mileage is statistically significant (Table 2, Panel A). As we can see, the effect of highway 
infrastructure (hwy_0) differs between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas both statistically 
and practically. In metropolitan areas, one additional mile of highway per thousand of county 
residents (hwy_0) associates with some decrease in income growth rate. However this effect 
becomes more positive with higher values of the policy treatment (quadratic term, hwy_2, is 
positive but insignificant). The negative association of highway improvements and growth in 
metropolitan area may be caused by higher inflow of labor, goods and services from outside of a 
county out-competing local labor and businesses. On the other hand, the reduction in 
transportation cost and commuting time brought by better infrastructure may be not as dramatic 
  18 as in rural areas. Confirming this conclusion we can see that in non-metropolitan areas we have 
positive and significant highway impact on growth. One additional mile of highways per 1,000 
of residents of non-metropolitan county would increase income growth by 0.8 to 0.4 percent per 
year holding other factors fixed. This effect is decreasing with the scale of improvement. 
However the turning point (about 150 – 200 miles per 1,000 non-metropolitan residents) is out of 
range of policy treatment in our dataset. 
TABLE 2: Panel B. Job growth, Metro/non-metro   
  Metropolitan  Non-metropolitan 
  gr1 gr2 gr3  gr4  gr1 gr2 gr3 gr4 



















































































































































































    
Standard errors in parentheses  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Fixed Effect estimation procedure is used. Control variables are suppressed for display purposes. 
Estimates in bold indicate that difference between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas is individually 
significant at 10% level. 
 
Looking at the effect of the highways on the job growth we can see a negative 
association. Similar to the Panel A, the effect of highways is more positive in non-metropolitan 
areas. The scale of the infrastructure (quadratic term) is positive in non-metropolitan areas. The 
  19 turning point, after which the association with the growth becomes positive, is between 33 and 
58 miles per thousand of residents of non-metropolitan counties, holding other factors fixed.  
The negative impact of highway infrastructure on the job growth is counterintuitive. One 
explanation to this result would be that local producers (particularly in metropolitan areas) facing 
a reduction in transportation cost may benefit from outsourcing some jobs to the areas with lower 
cost of labor. This effect becomes less negative over time and is weaker in non-metropolitan 
areas. 
While counterintuitive, the findings fit well the previous literature on highway impact. 
Helms (1985) finds a positive and significant effect of highways on personal income growth 




Renaissance Zone (RZ) 
The association between the area of a RZ (ren_0) and growth rates of income and jobs is 
positive and significant in non-metropolitan areas with decreasing scale effect (the squared term, 
ren_2, is negative). There is no significant association between the RZ acreage and growth in 
metropolitan areas. However, the difference in the effects is not statistically significant. 
The results imply that one additional acre of zone per thousand of non-metropolitan 
residents would increase, for example, two-year average income growth by 0.05 percent and this 
effect would decrease with every additional acre. At the same time the policy effect on the job 
growth is near 0.07 percent per acre decreasing with the rate of 0.001 percent per acre.  
In non-metropolitan areas, where a statistically significant result is observed, the 
magnitude of the policy effect doesn’t change much over time. It implies that the reduction in the 
                                                 
8 See R.Fisher (1997) for extensive literature review on the issue. 
  20 tax rates within the zones are large enough to facilitate long term growth by compensating for 
disadvantages of economically distressed areas holding other factors fixed. This result is 
consistent with previous findings (Papke, 1993, 1994). 
 
Brownfield Redevelopment Authorities (BDA) 
The number of BDAs (bda_0) does not have any significant effect on income or job 
growth. However, longer run impact or heterogeneity with respect to other factors may be 
expected. Loh (1993) finds that the policies do not increase taxable property values for many 
years and since the primary effect of BDA comes through this avenue we shouldn’t expect to 
observe the results in such a short run as in our study. 
This result is not surprising. Mayer and Lyons (2000) suggest that the role of government 
in brownfield redevelopment is very limited. Also some sites are too small to change a property 
value in a neighborhood. On the other hand, BDA is a community-oriented policy. Loh (1993) 
argues that such policies would have insignificant effect on growth outcomes. 
 
MEGA 
The association between the number of MEGAs (mega_0) and income growth is negative 
with a few exceptions. The estimate is significant for three and four-year growth in metropolitan 
counties. This effect becomes more positive with increased scale (mega_2) in the longer run in 
metropolitan areas. It implies that after the turning point of about 3 MEGAs per 100,000 of 
metropolitan residents the policy association with income growth becomes positive. Relatively 
small benefits may be observed because the growth authorities may not change the local wage 
earnings significantly. New jobs created by the authorities may have lower than average wage 
rate and new investments may be utilized to purchase equipment out of local area. Low local 
  21 benefits do not increase a tax revenue and local personal income while increasing demand for 
public services. That may lead to negative association with income growth.  
Alternative explanation is due to possibility that policy treatment stays endogenous. The 
number of authorities in a county has a little variation over time. However, faster growing 
counties attracts more in-migrants, which decreases per capita policy treatment. 
The association of MEGAs with job growth is positive for the first two years, which is 
what we have expected. However, low statistical significance of the results prevents us from 
making any firm conclusions. However, we will return to the effect of BDAs and MEGAs later 
in this paper. 
 
In summary, the effect of the policies on income growth is significantly different between 
metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. The policy effects are jointly significant in determining 
income and job growth when heterogeneity is taken into account. 
 
Heterogeneity with respect to industry structure 
Heterogeneity of policy effects with respect to industrial structure of a local economy 
adds one more dimension to the analysis (see Table 3). The regions with more and less than state 
average share of jobs in manufacturing are treated as separate sub-areas for that purpose. 
The results look similar to the previous table. The estimates for areas with above the 
average share of manufacturing are similar to the results for metropolitan areas. The growth in 
below the average areas responds to the policy shocks similarly to that in non-metropolitan areas. 
However a few differences have to be highlighted.  
The estimates of the highway impact on the job growth differ slightly from the previous 
table. The effects for the below average areas are significant and imply that areas with more than 
55-65 miles per 1,000 residents have higher job growth.  
  22 The effect of the RZ is statistically different between the sub-areas for one-year growth. 
The effect is higher in non-manufacturing areas. The policy effect on income growth becomes 
positive in manufacturing-dependent areas beyond of 70-90 acres of zone per 1,000 of county 
residents. The policy impact is positive and significant for one-year income growth in counties 
with below average share of manufacturing. 
 
TABLE 3. Michigan Development Policy Effects by Share of Manufacturing 
TABLE 3: Panel A. Income Growth, Manufacturing 
 Above state average share of jobs in 
manufacturing 
Below state average share of jobs in 
manufacturing 

























































































































































Observations  293 293 258 219 371  371  323  279 
R-squared  0.65 0.79 0.84 0.84 0.48  0.59  0.74  0.81 
Policies  
F-statistics 





































    
 
The effect of BDAs becomes more significant individually in its impact on income 
growth in a longer run. Association of the number of MEGAs with income and job growth is 
more negative but more significant individually the previous case. It means that differentiation 
with respect to industrial structure of the area allows estimating the policy effect more precisely.  
  23 Statistical difference of the policy effect on the income growth by share of manufacturing 
is jointly significant. However the joint significance of the impact on job growth is significant 
only for the one-year growth model. 
 
TABLE 3: Panel B. Job growth, Manufacturing 
  Above state average share of jobs in 
manufacturing 
Below state average share of jobs in 
manufacturing 
















































































































































Observations  293 293 258  219  371 371 323 279 
R-squared  0.62 0.74 0.77  0.83  0.38 0.47 0.54 0.66 
Policies  
F-statistics 



































    
Standard errors in parentheses  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Fixed Effect estimation procedure is used. Control variables are suppressed for display purposes. 
Estimates in bold indicate that difference between more and less manufacturing dependant areas is individually 
significant at 10% level. 
 
Heterogeneity with respect to the income level 
Another dimension of heterogeneity in policy effects can arise along the income level 
line. To test whether this is true, we have divided the state by counties with above and below 
state average per capita personal income level. The estimation results in Table 4 indicate that the 
  24 difference is statistically significant for the income growth model. However for the job growth 
model the policy effect is not statistically different jointly.  
The major difference of this set of results from previous tables is that BDA policy effect 
becomes statistically different between the sub-areas of the state. The effect of this policy on 
three-year growth of income and jobs becomes individually significant. The estimates imply that 
the linear effect (bda_0) is more negative in areas with above average income. The effect in 
these sub-areas becomes positive more quickly than in below-average counterparts (the quadratic 
term is larger). The effect on the three-year income growth becomes positive after the point of 
2.8 authorities and for the job growth after 3.3 authorities per 100,000 residents of counties with 
above average income. 
 
TABLE 4. Michigan Development Policy Effects by Income Level 
TABLE 4: Panel A. Income Growth, Income 
  Above state average per capita income  Below state average per capita income 















































































































































Observations  306 306  258 210  358 358 323 288 
R-squared  0.68 0.80  0.85 0.85  0.40 0.50 0.66 0.72 
Policies  
F-statistics 
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TABLE 4: Panel B. Job Growth, Income 
  Above state average per capita income  Below state average per capita income 









































































































































Observations  306  306  258 210  358 358 323 288 
R-squared  0.50  0.66  0.75 0.81  0.40 0.48 0.54 0.67 
Policies  
F-statistics 

































    
Standard errors in parentheses  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Fixed Effect estimation procedure is used. Control variables are suppressed for display purposes. 
Estimates in bold indicate that difference between areas with higher and lower per capita income is individually 
significant at 10% level. 
 
The effect of MEGAs on the job growth preserves the pattern presented previously. 
However the estimates are more significant. This effect is positive for one and two-year growth 
turning to be negative and insignificant. Such result is not surprising. Most of the jobs attributed 
to an expansion project are created within the first year (Bradshaw, 2002). The other results are 
similar in sign and magnitude to the previous tables however less significant. 
To conclude on regional heterogeneity of policy effects, it is important to emphasize that 
a statistically significant difference in policy effects is found. The lines along which the policy 
effect may change are different for different policies. Finally the policy effect is less 
  26 heterogeneous for the job growth than for the income growth, for that reason the base model for 
job growth performs well compared with the income growth base model. 
 
Policy interactions 
Before turning to the conclusions, the hypothesis regarding policy interactions should be 
tested. Since many policies are implemented simultaneously the effect of one policy may 
facilitate or counterbalance the effect of the other. Moreover, interactions are often imbedded in 
policy design. This fact may also lead to the inconsistencies in results of previous studies. 
To test whether this hypothesis is true, we have included the interactions among the 
policy treatments into the model estimated separately for metro/non-metro areas. The results are 
presented on Table 5. They indicate that our hypothesis cannot be rejected for the income growth 
model. Several interactions are significant individually. They are also significant jointly for three 
and four-year growth.  
The individual effects of highways and BDAs are very similar to the results in the Table 
2. The effect of the RZ becomes more significant statistically and practically. With the exception 
of the results for one-year growth, the area of the zone has positive association with the income 
growth rate but the effect is decreasing with scale. The turning point for the metropolitan area 
(about 22-33 acres per 1,000 of residents) is close to the maximum amount of policy treatment 
applied in Michigan metropolitan counties. On the other hand, the turning point for non-
metropolitan areas (49-90 acres per 1,000 of residents) is well within the range of values of 
policy treatment for those areas. It implies that in several cases Michigan policymakers were too 
generous granting the policy benefits to non-metropolitan areas.  
The results for brownfields confirm conclusions of other authors that the government role 
is very limited. As Mayer and Lyons (2000) suggest, a larger effect of government intervention 
  27 may come through making a neighborhood with a brownfield more attractive for business 
development by improving infrastructure and other factors of business environment. In our 
results we observe positive and in some cases significant interaction effect of BDA with other 
policies, suggesting that Mayer and Lyons conclusions are right. 
 
TABLE 5. Michigan Development Policy Effects with Interactions by Metro/non-metro 
TABLE 5: Panel A. Income Growth, Interactions 
  Metropolitan  Non-metropolitan 
 gr1  gr2  gr3  gr4  gr1 gr2 gr3 gr4 
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TABLE 5: Panel B. Job Growth, Interactions 
  Metropolitan  Non-metropolitan 
  gr1 gr2 gr3  gr4  gr1 gr2 gr3 gr4 


































































































































































































































































































    
Standard errors in parentheses  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Fixed Effect estimation procedure is used. Control variables are suppressed for display purposes. 
 
The other difference in the results is that the effect of MEGA in the metropolitan areas is 
positive but statistically insignificant. This set of results on MEGA is close to findings by Gross 
and Phillips (1999), who found a positive relationship between the individual enterprise tax 
  29 abatement and the income growth in Nebraska counties, while having an insignificant effect on 
the employment growth. 
With regard to the interactions, highways and RZ have mutually enforcing effect on 
income growth. In other words, if there is a new highway in a county with a renaissance zone, 
the effect of both policies on growth is stronger. The same is true for the mutual effect of 
MEGAs and all other policies in metro areas. 
The job growth model does not benefit from the inclusion of the interaction terms. They 
are not significant neither jointly nor individually. This inclusion makes the estimation less 
precise and policy effects as a result are less significant statistically. 
 
To summarize, job growth should correspond to income growth trends since wage is a 
part of personal income. Keeping this in mind, we can look at the difference in policy effects 
between income and job growth as on changes in income distribution patterns. For example, if 
we observe a positive effect on job growth but not on income growth we can suspect that either 
part of the jobs go to commuters or a substitution effect in the sources of income (e.g. 
unemployment subsidies are substituted with some wage income without raising well-being). 
The other extreme point would be when we observe a positive effect on income growth without 
growth or even with decline in the number of jobs. This situation implies that the source of 
income growth is either an increase in property value, or increase in proprietary income, or 
substitution of labor for other factors. The ideal policy would have positive impact on both 
growth outcomes. 
 
  30 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have implemented a quantitative assessment of the impact of Michigan 
economic development policies and highway infrastructure improvements on personal income 
and job growth. The policies have statistically significant impact on the growth outcomes. 
However, the effects change across different types of local economies. For example, highway 
improvements benefit rural communities more than urban. Significantly different effects are also 
detected between areas with different levels of income and different industry structure. Highway 
improvements increase income growth but reduce the number of jobs in local economy (at least 
in the short run). Conversely, MEGAs increase a number of jobs but have a little impact on 
income growth. 
The marginal effect of policies changes with the scale of policy treatment, implying that 
there is a minimum threshold necessary for a positive impact. Also there is a point after which 
policies become counterproductive. 
Significant interaction between policy effects is also detected. And finally, the size of the 
policy effects varies over time. For example, MEGAs effect on the job growth disappears after 
approximately two years, while the effect of RZ stays longer. 
The policy effects on the income growth differ significant among the sub-areas of the 
state. Ignoring this fact leads to underestimation of local policy effects. On the other hand, the 
job growth model has relatively less of heterogeneity imbedded.  
Some of the results have broader implications. The policy treatment such as Renaissance 
Zone can be considered as an external to local residents and businesses change in tax regime. 
  31 Thus, implementation of the policies can be treated as a “natural experiment”
 9. The results imply 
that lower taxes or transportation costs stimulate local income growth holding other factors fixed. 
However, it does not guarantee job growth. 
In the light of the current trends in economic development when communities, especially 
in rural areas, are increasingly vulnerable to globalization processes it is extremely important to 
tailor the development policies to the specifics of targeted areas. Our results show that one-size-
fits-all approach is not appropriate to regional economic development. 
Even though statistical and practical significance is observed, results should be 
interpreted with caution. The measures of heterogeneity are far from being perfect. For example, 
Papke (1991) shows that the effect of infrastructure varies significantly across industries within 
the manufacturing sector. The measure of urbanization used in this study might not capture all 
the differences between urban, fringe and rural areas. Also, other sources of heterogeneity such 
as unemployment rate are possible (Bartik, 1991). For example, Bartik (1991) and several other 
authors (e.g. Gross and Phillips, 1999) argue that policy effect should be higher in regions with 
higher unemployment rate due to higher social benefits, others argue that if policies stimulate 
labor demand under low unemployment more people would be attracted to the labor force and 
thus the effect should be higher under low unemployment. 
Measures of the policy treatment are also not perfect. Highway miles do not measure all 
of the changes in quality of infrastructure. Also, normalization of policy treatment by population 
may introduce additional endogeneity due to migration. Moreover, selection bias might not be 
completely excluded. In addition, there are costs associated with the use of the policy tools, 
which may offset the benefits. Those costs are not controlled for in our model. 
                                                 
9 Bartik (1991, 1997) argues that taxes and public spending are highly endogenous to growth and without an external 
shock it is impossible to determine their impact with any precision. 
  32 We use one to four-year average growth rates as dependent variables to capture policy 
effect over time in our analytical model. However, there are several reasons why it is not a 
perfect approach. First, averaging discards all the short-term effects. If a policy has, for example, 
an effect on the one-year growth but with some time lag, this effect would be underestimated. On 
the other hand, averaging reveals longer-term effects even if they are relatively small 
comparative to the short-run noise. Second, in the long run we have fewer observations on the 
dependent variable. Moreover, the observations are lacking on the more recent years, when most 
of the policy treatment was applied. For that reason, we cannot make a direct comparison of the 
estimation results for different time periods. An alternative approach would be to look at the one-
year growth rate with leads in the future. However, other estimation techniques should be used 
for that purpose.  
Nevertheless, the results provide a robustness check for the findings in an adjacent time 
periods. They also provide some insight on how the policy effects change over time and space. 
The results of our empirical analysis contribute to better understanding of the 
development policy effect and can be used to set priorities among different policy tools. They 
also allow having better expectation of the policy impact. Addressing the above-mentioned 
problems in policy analysis is a direction for future research. 
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  35 APPENDIX 1. Summary statistics
10 
Table A1.1. Dependent variables 
Label Variable  Years  Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
gr1_inc  1993 – 2000  664  1.545  2.847  -11.565  14.725 
gr2_inc  1993 – 2000  664  1.245  2.049  -7.038  6.626 


















gr4_inc  1993 – 1998  498  1.624  1.246  -5.639  5.132 
gr1_emp  1993 – 2000  664  1.045  2.294  -13.244  23.985 
gr2_emp  1993 – 2000  664  .799  1.870  -8.924  16.156 















gr4_emp  1993 – 1998  498  .900  1.305  -7.010  15.223 
Data: Local Area Annual Estimates, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Note: 1, 2, 3 and 4 year average percentage change in per capita personal income and number of jobs 
 
Table A1.2. Control variables, 1993-2000 
Label Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Per capita personal income
a, 000  inc  664  20.795  4.900  11.180  35.733 
Percentage of population with bachelor degree
b  educ_p 664  8.140  3.217  2.977  15.650 
Number of jobs per 1000 of residents
a  job 664  540.99  127.23  256.42  802.87 
Number of jobs in manufacturing per 1000 of 
residents
a 
manuf 664  10.109  3.420 .946 19.683 
Population density
a  denst 664  1,188.56  1,258.47  3.423  3,441.677 
Business establishment density
c  denst_e 664  25.107  22.710  .091  58.876 
Data: a) Based on Local Area Annual Estimates, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
b) Based on Census of population 1990, 2000. Data for 1993-99 is imputed by linear extrapolation 
  c) County Business Patterns, Census Bureau 
 
Policy variables, 1993-2000 
Table A1.3. Absolute value of policy treatment by metro/non-metro 
Non-metropolitan Metropolitan  Label Variable 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Federal, State and major 
county highways, miles
a 
hwy_a  354.50 91.22  158.93 589.52 761.65 245.46 252.18 1,073.34 
Area of the Renaissance 
Zone, acre
b 
ren_a  80.50  334.07 0  2202  229.68 465.00 0  1756.07 
Number of Brownfield 
Redevelopment 
Authorities in a county
c 
bda_e  .27  .67  0 4 2.03  4.26  0 16 
Number of Michigan 
Economic Growth 
Authorities in a county
b 
mega_e  .10  .31  0 1 1.49  2.45  0 12 
    Counties: Obs=336 Counties: Obs=328 
Data: a) Michigan Department of Transportation 
  b) Michigan Economic Development Corporation 
  c) Victor Land Use Institute, Michigan State University Extension 
Note: Policy treatment as for 01 January of a given year.  
 
                                                 
10 For Michigan counties. Population weighted. 
  36 Table A1.4. Per capita policy treatment by metro/non-metro 
Non-metropolitan  Metropolitan  Label Variable 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max  Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Federal, State and major county 
highways, miles
a per 1,000 of residents 
hwy_a  14.41  8.13 4.47 85.82  2.52  2.62  .49 15.86 
Area of the Renaissance Zone, acres
b 
per 1,000 of residents 
ren_a  3.36  15.07  0 110.1  .37  1.66  0 26.43 
Number of Brownfield Redevelopment 
Authorities in a county
c per 100,000 of 
residents 
bda_e .81  2.34  0  23.09  .35  .76  0  6.86 
Number of Michigan Economic 
Growth Authorities in a county
b per 
100,000 of residents 
mega_e .33  1.04 0  14.27  .26 .55 0  4.45 
   Counties:  Obs=336  Counties:  Obs=328 
Data: a) Michigan Department of Transportation 
  b) Michigan Economic Development Corporation 
  c) Victor Land Use Institute, Michigan State University Extension 
Note: Policy treatment as for 01 January of a given year. A demeaned value of the policy treatment is used for the 
estimation. 
  37 APPENDIX 2. Results 
Table A2.1. Income Growth Base model 























































































































































Observations  664 664 581 498 
Number  of  FIPS  83 83 83 83 
R-squared  0.50 0.66 0.76 0.79 
Policy variables 
F-statistics 











Standard errors in parentheses  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Fixed Effect estimation procedure is used. Year dummies are suppressed for display purposes. 
 
  38 Table A2.2. Job growth Base model         































































































































































Observations  664 664 581 498 
Number  of  FIPS  83 83 83 83 
R-squared  0.41 0.52 0.60 0.70 
Policy variables 
F-statistics 













Standard errors in parentheses  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Fixed Effect estimation procedure is used. Year dummies are suppressed for display purposes. 
 
  39 Table A2.3. Income Growth Metro/non-metro     
  Metropolitan  Non-metropolitan 















































































































































































































































































































Observations  328  328 287 246 336 336 294 252 
Number of 
FIPS 
41  41 41 41 42 42 42 42 




























Standard errors in parentheses  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Fixed Effect estimation procedure is used. Year dummies are suppressed for display purposes. 
 
  40 Table A2 4. Job growth Metro/non-metro    
  Metropolitan  Non-metropolitan 
















































































































































































































































































































Observations  328 328 287 246 336  336 294 252 
Number of 
FIPS 
41 41 41 41 42  42 42 42 




























Standard errors in parentheses  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Fixed Effect estimation procedure is used. Year dummies are suppressed for display purposes. 
 
  41 Table A2.5. Michigan Development Policy Effects on Income Growth with Interactions by 
Metro/non-metro  
  Metropolitan  Non-metropolitan 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































Observations  328 328 287 246 336 336 294 252 
Number of 
FIPS 
41 41 41 41 42 42 42 42 
R-squared  0.69 0.82 0.86 0.85 0.42 0.59 0.75 0.81 
All  policy  2.24 1.92 3.36 1.25 1.89 2.46 2.44 2.72 
  42 variables 
F-statistics 
[Prob > F] 
[0.007] [0.024] [0.0001]  [0.243] [0.028] [0.003] [0.004] [0.002] 
Interactions 
F-statistics 

















Standard errors in parentheses  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Fixed Effect estimation procedure is used. Year dummies are suppressed for display purposes. 
 
Table A2.6. Michigan Development Policy Effects on Job Growth with Interactions by 
Metro/non-metro   
  Metropolitan  Non-metropolitan 











































































































































































































































































































































































































Observations  328 328 287 246 336  336 294 252 
Number of 
FIPS 
41 41 41 41 42  42 42 42 








































Standard errors in parentheses  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Fixed Effect estimation procedure is used. Year dummies are suppressed for display purposes. 
 